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In 2008 Russia had
the worst stock
market in the world.
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In 2009 it had the
second-best stock
market in the world.
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• Late Brezhnev era, Gorbachev,
Yeltsin, 1981-1999
1) 18 years of shrinking rents.
2) Loss of control of rents.
• Putin era, 20001) New rent explosion.
2) Control of rents regained.
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How Did Putin Do It?
• Did NOT re-nationalize Russian economy.
• Putin is not a “crypto-Soviet” leader.
• He knows that market economy is
superior.
• Needs private owners, market economy,
to make Russia competitive.
• Dilemma: How to harness the private
owners and make them work for you.
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• Putin inherits “Oligarchic Capitalism” from
Yeltsin.
• 1996 - “Loans for Shares” mean oligarchs
rule Russia.
• 1996 - Putin arrives in Moscow, a virtual
nobody.
• 1997-98 - oligarchs on the brink of mutual
destruction.
• 1997-98 - Putin acquires means to save the
oligarchs ... and subject them to his
System.
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The Oligarchs’ Problem
• The weapon the oligarchs were stockpiling to use
against each other was financial information,
financial intelligence.
• This was the potentially most destructive weapon.
• It was “mutually assured destruction” - not
between just two or three, but an entire group.
And they had already started the war (the
“Bankers’ War”).
• Ultimate brinksmanship, “Cuban Missile Crisis.”
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Putin’s Attitude Toward Oligarchs
The stratum of truly leading entrepreneurs in
Russia is “very thin and very precious . . . they
are the bearers of capital, of intellect, of
technologies.”
“The oil men are no less important than the oil;
the state has to make the most of them both.”
-- Putin aide Vladislav Surkov, summer 2000
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A Deal of Mutual Advantage
• For the oligarchs, Putin is their only hope for
continued survival and wealth.
• For Putin, the oligarchs represent the
mechanism through he can ensure maximum
creation of rent and its effective distribution.
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Details of the Deal
• Keep property
• Manage with virtually no
interference
• Grow the companies
• Get personally richer
• Be protected against
expropriation – or worse!

• Pay taxes – in cash, in
full
– Don’t try to change tax
laws
– Don’t collude with
governors

• Share wealth informally
– “Excess costs” (keep
addicts happy)
– Philanthropy

• Let Putin make strategic
decisions (esp. foreign)
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Putin’s System
• This is real meaning of “Kremlin, Inc.” or
“Russia, Inc.”
– A tiny number of individuals – including private
owners – who run entire economy
– They are in turn controlled [monitored] by a nineman board of directors: Putin + 2 first deputy prime
ministers + six deputy prime ministers.

• Medvedev?
– Not particularly important?
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“The Don”

“The Underboss”

“The Consigliere”
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The Key to Putin’s System
• In contrast to a classic mafia-style “protection
racket” (extortion), Putin offered something the
oligarchs desperately needed: protection against
each other!
• They were about to mutually self-destruct. He
gave them a way out.
• That is why it has been so stable.
• (Lucky Luciano’s “National Commission”)
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Next steps: Meet priorities for
rent use
• Priority 1: sovereignty
• Priority 2: stability

For each:
• Step 1: regain
• Step 2: secure and protect
• Step 3: enhance
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Sovereignty: Soviet Lesson for
Today’s Russia
• USSR did not collapse because defeated
militarily
• Collapsed because lost political sovereignty
• Lost political sovereignty when lost financial
sovereignty
• Lesson: Restore financial sovereignty!
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Achieving Sovereignty
• January 2000
– $8.5 billion in foreign exchange reserves
– $133 government external debt

• Mid-2008
– $600 billion in forex reserves
– Debt is around $30 billion

• Key date: January 2005
– Paid off IMF debt 3.5 years ahead of schedule
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Simplest indicator of sovereignty - therefore independence of
foreign policy -- is size of foreign
exchange reserves
• Although drawn down in crisis, Russia’s are
still the third largest in the world
• (Only China and Japan bigger)
21

Stability: Sharing the Rent
• Total value of oil and gas shared in society
in different ways
• Main distinction: formal and informal rentsharing
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Rent Sharing
after-tax profit
formal taxes

Total Rent

pre-tax profit

informal taxes

price subsidies
excess
extraction
cost

natural extraction cost

reported
cost of
production
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Khodorkovsky
• Founding member of Oligarchs’ Club
• Initially, Poster Boy for Putin’s Deal
• Later decides there is better way:
– Transparency
– Formality

• Khodorkovsky’s alternative model unacceptable
• Arrested fall 2003
– Now in GULAG
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For the rest, a pretty good deal:
Consider Forbes “Billionaires List”
2000: 4 Russians,
total wealth $12 billion
2008: 87 Russians,
total wealth $470 billion
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Most Important Issue for Russia:
What Will Future Rents Be?
• Rent = Price x Quantity
• Russia does not control world price
• No one knows the future oil price
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Russia does control quantity, but
there are issues:
• Western Siberia - “easy oil” - “legacy oil”
• Eastern Siberia, Far East, Arctic completely
different
• No infrastructure
• Much colder, more remote (“Siberian Curse”
thesis)
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Running out of oil?
“Yes” and “No”
• YES: Definitely running out of “legacy oil”
• NO: Actual amount of oil in East could be
huge. No one yet knows.
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But if believe main price forecasts,
not a bad future for Russia
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Implications for international behavior:
Bad news for those who think economic
crisis will make Russia docile again (“Good
Russia” of Yeltsin era)
• Fundamental economic health is NOT a
prerequisite for Russia’s “assertiveness” or
even “aggressiveness.”
• Only need political sovereignty
• Putin achieved that
• He will not sacrifice sovereignty
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